The Secret War Against Yugoslavia

The Secret War Against Yugoslavia
http://www.waynemadsenreport.com/
Wayne Madsen

April 20, 1999

Every American should remember March 24, 1999. On that day, for the first time in its history, the United States military attacked a friendly country – the tiny democratic and pro-western Republic of Montenegro nestled in the Balkan tinderbox between Albania, Kosovo, Serbia, Bosnia, and Croatia . During the night of the first wave of NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia, Montenegro’s airport in the capital city of Podgorica was hit, as well as military sites around the port city at Bar. According to the Montenegrin News Agency Montenafax, other cities struck included Ulcinj, Herceg Novi, and Danilovgrad. Montenegro, although officially part of the Yugoslav federation with Serbia, elected a democratic and anti-Milosevic government in 1998. U.S. military planners contend that Montenegro, which provides Serbia’s only outlet to the sea, was a necessary casualty of the war because it hosted Serbian military radar, missile batteries, and airfields that NATO planes flying from bases in Italy had to cross to bomb Serbia. The NATO planes could have bypassed Montenegro completely if Greece had allowed them to fly from bases there. That was problematic since Athens maintains excellent ties with Serbia and does not want to upset its relationship with Milosevic.

Montenegro and its largely pro-Western people became pawns in a deadly game between Washington and Belgrade. Montenegro, which in Serbo-Croat is called “Crna Gora” and which literally means “Black Mountain,” was an independent kingdom until 1918 when it joined the Yugoslav kingdom. Many Montenegrins, including the current government, would prefer resuming independence especially after witnessing the international ostracizing of their Serb partners after the ethnic purges conducted by them in neighboring Kosovo and Bosnia. In fact, on March 23, 1999, a day before NATO’s bombing campaign began, the Montenegro government issued the following statement: “The Government of the Republic of Montenegro does not recognize today’s decision of the Federal Government to declare a state of emergency.” It also said it remained “firm in its position that the so-called Federal Government of Yugoslavia is illegal and illegitimate.” Those statements were viewed by Belgrade as portending a declaration of independence by Montenegro, something that previously occurred with Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

U.S. Intelligence Role in Montenegro

Having a pro-Western government in Montenegro was clearly something of interest to America’s military and intelligence planners. Although Montenegro clearly had legitimate claims to self-determination from Serbia, Washington’s espionage sleuths never see anything so altruistic when figuring out how to capitalize on situations and events. To them, Montenegro was a target of opportunity, a place from which to base secret operations in the region. On March 17, it was reported that Montenegro’s pro-Serbian Socialist opposition had caught wind of an American (possibly CIA or Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)) program to train members of Montenegro’s special police. Although a Montenegrin government representative refused to comment on U.S. training of Montenegrin paramilitary forces, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, in a press conference on March 24, urged Montenegrins (especially Serb Montenegrins) to “remain calm and avoid confrontation with public security forces.” U.S. Special Envoy to the Balkans Robert Gelbard reiterated U.S. support for Montenegro’s police force as early as January 1999. In an interview with Radio Montenegro he said, “the Montenegrin government has a very professional police force and I trust that Montenegrin government institutions can deal with [disturbances fomented by Milosevic and his allies in Montenegro].” These were clear indications that the United States counted on Montenegro’s security force as a potential ally in the region. The irony was that these same forces had to contend with the worst possible public calamity: heavy nightly air strikes by U.S. bombs and cruise missiles. One opposition member of the Montenegrin parliament claimed that U.S. training of the country’ s police was the first step towards creating a Montenegrin army. Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), a firm seen by many observers as being very close to U.S. intelligence, currently trains foreign police forces in anti-terrorism operations. The program is run by the State Department and is conducted jointly by SAIC and Louisiana State University.

America’s involvement with Montenegro’s Special Police came shortly after Djukanovic came to power in October 1997. Knowing that his predecessor, the rabidly pro-Milosevic Momir Bulatovic, had sympathizers in the Montenegrin police, Djukanovic’s Interior Minister. Vukasin Maras, the former head of the Montenegrin Secret Service, set about purging the pro-Bulatovic political appointees from the police. He wanted to turn the police into a more professional force. Maras also recruited former Montenegrin officers from the Federal Yugoslav army. These experienced military men and their Montenegrin nationalist sympathies would auger well for a future pro-NATO independent Montenegrin army in the region.

Information Warfare

Montenegro’s opposition to the Serb-NATO war and its independent stance has caused it innumerable problems. During the first week of the NATO attacks, the Montenegro Trade Mission could not comment on the reports of stepped up Serb military pressure on Montenegro. The reason is that the main Yugoslav telephone exchange at Ivanca near Belgrade handles all telephone calls to and from Montenegro. Every time NATO launches an attack on Yugoslavia, the exchange is apparently temporarily knocked off line by some sort of specialized electronic NATO attack on the network. When the bombing raids are complete, the telephone exchange begins operating again. This has posed problems for the Montenegrin mission in keeping in close contact with government officials in Podgorica. The Ivanca site is sensitive with the Serbs. One Serb source who works in the telecommunications industry in Belgrade was quite curt when asked about the importance of the Telekom Serbia facility: “It’s not the central telco switch. It’s not near Belgrade. It’s not important for the public at all.”

Shortly after the NATO bombing campaign began, NBC reported that U.S. forces used a top secret warfare system to temporarily knock out power grids and jam Serb military computers that run their air defenses. Military sources revealed to NBC that even a minor disruption can destroy critical data and disable defensive missile systems. Over the past few years, the Pentagon and U.S. intelligence agencies have honed their capabilities in fighting an “information war.” Such warfare seeks to disrupt not only power grids and military command and control systems but also commercial telephone exchanges like the one at Ivanca. One Serb involved in establishing the pro-democratic Internet-based Radio Station B-92 confirmed the importance of Ivanca to Internet-based communications with Serbia. “Knocking out the Ivanca site would pretty much kill Internet contact with Yugoslavia,” he said.

Surveillance of Enemies of the United States

One particular target of interest to the NSA in conducting surveillance of pro-Serb allies in the Balkan region is the Republic of Mount Athos (Agion Oros in Greek), a quasi-independent state established in the 9th century in a charming Halkidiki peninsula of Greece that juts into the Aegean Sea. On the peninsula is situated the capital of the monastic community, Karyes. Located in Karyes is the “Konakia,” which houses representatives of all 19 monasteries, including Chilandar, the monastery of the Serbian Orthodox Church. The Serbian monastery is thought to provide sanctuary to a few alleged Serb war criminals from the war in Bosnia. They may still be useful in providing advice to Milosevic’s special police units in Kosovo. Mount Athos most likely first came under the scrutiny of NSA during 1997, when it was rumored that indicted Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic had sought refuge at the Chilandar monastery.

NSA maintains a huge surveillance capability in the region around Greece, including an eavesdropping station on Greek soil itself at Iraklion on the island of Crete and an all-but-certain joint CIA/National Security Agency (NSA) Special Collection Service (SCS) unit operating out of the U.S. Embassy in Athens. NSA’s eavesdropping network is quite effective in the Greek region. In February 1999, NSA’s secret listening posts and surveillance satellites were used to intercept at least two mobile phone calls made by Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan from Athens and Corfu. This intelligence aided the CIA and Turkish intelligence in later capturing the Kurdish Workers’ Party leader in Nairobi, Kenya. A month later, the NSA turned its eavesdropping “ears” in the region from Kurds to Serbs. Of particular interest were Milosevic’s homes in Athens, Corfu, and Crete.

The United States also used a financial intelligence tracking system called FINCEN (Financial Crimes Enforcement Network) to track the disposition of Milosevic’s wealth outside of Yugoslavia. As a result of NSA, DIA, and CIA intelligence input to FINCEN, it was determined that much of it was stashed in numbered accounts in Cyprus, Greece, and a number of Russian banks. Not coincidentally, Milosevic sent his wife and children to Cyprus during the NATO attacks as a safety measure.

America’s web of surveillance during the Balkans War has even spread to American citizens. When some Serbian Orthodox churches in the Sacramento, Milwaukee, Chicago and Indianapolis areas received a one-page fax written in Serbo-Croat urging Serbian-Americans to attack American military personnel, the FBI increased its surveillance of Serb individuals and institutions throughout the United States. Oddly, Serbian Orthodox priests in many cities, including Seattle, reported that they had not heard about the fax. Of particular interest to the FBI were Serbian American churches in the Washington, DC area. Washington was to be the site of an April fiftieth anniversary summit meeting, which was to bring together some 40 heads of state and government. Later, the FBI backtracked somewhat by stating that it had no information indicating any particular individuals were planning acts of violence against military targets in the United States.

Nevertheless, with three million Serbian Americans in the United States, the FBI trained its infamous ethnic surveillance apparatus against yet another group of American citizens. The FBI conducted similar surveillance campaigns against Americans of Iraqi and Palestinian origin during the Gulf War and Muslim Americans in the wake of overseas terrorist attacks carried out against American interests by groups like Hamas and Hezbollah. Under U.S. law the FBI may target for surveillance any group seen as supporting enemies of the United States. Therefore, former U.S. congresswoman and unsuccessful GOP candidate for governor of Maryland Helen Delich Bentley, a Serbian-American and former president of Serb-Net, Inc. -- a lobbying group for Serbs -- could find her phone tapped by either the FBI or her closer Baltimore area neighbor – the NSA. Another potential target for surveillance is Republican Senator and former Ohio governor George Voinovich, a Serbian-American and outspoken opponent of the NATO bombing campaign against the country of his roots. A spokesman for Senator Voinovich said the senator was not aware of any increased surveillance of Serbian-American groups as a result of the Balkans war and preparations for the NATO’s April summit. Nevertheless, even powerful House Budget Committee chairman and presidential candidate John Kasich, a Croatian-American from Ohio who has been outspoken against the NATO attacks on Serbia, and fellow Ohioan, Democrat Dennis Kucinich, another Croatian-American who has a large Serb constituency, could find themselves on an FBI or NSA watch list as potential “fellow travelers” of the Serbs. There is a precedent for such activities by the spy agencies. During the Nicaraguan civil war, a number of congressmen, including Maryland’s Michael Barnes, were subject to NSA eavesdropping because it was felt that they were too supportive of the Sandinista government in Managua.

The U.S. law enforcement community appears to be anxious to go after Serbs. On April 14, 1999, in testimony before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, senior U.S. Border Patrol agent Mark Hall related a 1995 story about a group of some 20 Serbians who attempted to enter the United States from Windsor, Ontario by boat. A curious Canadian Broadcasting Corporation correspondent later asked Hall about the incident. Hall said that six of the Serbians were nationalists who were on the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s lookout list and were known to be terrorists. He later said that he had mistakenly read “Syrians” as “Serbians,” claiming there was a typographical error in his notes. However, the news was already out – “Serbians” had attempted to illegally enter the United States.

The 614 Waiver: U.S. Arms for Serbia

Although it sounds unbelievable in the wake of U.S. hostilities against Yugoslavia, the United States may have actually shipped arms to that nation under something called the 614 waiver. In the aftermath of the Dayton Accords over Bosnia, the Clinton administration apparently viewed Milosevic as an ally against America’s other great enemy: international drug dealing.

Testifying before the House National Security, International Affairs and Criminal Justice Subcommittee on May 1, 1997, Clinton “drug czar” General Barry McCaffrey, stated he wanted congressional “614 waivers” in order to ship weapons to several nations. Many of the countries had questionable human rights records but were important in America’s war against international drug dealing. “I have 14 waivers that the President granted for -- one for Serbia, Montenegro, Haiti, Somalia, Jordan, the list goes on and on,” McCaffrey told the panel headed up by a then little-known Illinois Republican congressman named Dennis Hastert. The lawmaker, explaining the 614 waivers, said that granting such waivers “puts us under caution to not provide these weapons or, for that matter, FMS [Foreign Military Sales] sales without an in use monitoring agreement.” Hastert further stated that the desire to send weapons to such countries as Serbia and Colombia resulted in a Senate amendment that required a (614) waiver. Nevertheless, he said he personally was “very supportive” of McCaffrey getting the money on a “long-term basis” or whatever term basis he needed to get arms to the Serbs and Montenegrins. It was Montenegro that would become particularly crucial. In October 1997, the Montenegrin special police was purging itself of pro-Milosevic and pro-Serbian elements. It was ripe to be transformed into a pro-U.S. force in the region.

In January 1999 the United States stepped up its support for an independent Montenegro. In setting up a diplomatic liaison office in Podgorica, Washington was signaling Montenegro that this was a preliminary step to opening a full-blown embassy in the country after independence. The United States had previously opened similar liaison offices in neighboring Macedonia and Bosnia as a prelude to granting full diplomatic recognition. At the same time, U.S. Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke warned Milosevic not to undermine Djukanovic’s government and to keep the Yugoslav army out of Montenegro. Gelbard and America’s diplomatic representative to Montenegro, Michael Scanlon, became frequent visitors to the Villa Gorica, President Djukanovic’s house in Podgorica. Undoubtedly, the Americans came offering increased support. It was shortly after these visits that it was discovered that Montenegrin special police were receiving specialized training in the United States.

The CIA, while busy funneling aid to the KLA, was also trying to promote Montenegro’s eventual secession from Yugoslavia. By early 1999, the spy agency established what it called “analytical structures” in former and current Yugoslav republics -- Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Montenegro, the Bosnian Serb Republic, and Serbia itself. The U.S. diplomatic office in Podgorica undoubtedly provided cover for CIA operations there. It also served as an important base for NATO’s 1998 attempt to capture Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic. The Bosnian Serb, who was born in a small village in Montenegro, often traveled there to see his mother and other relatives. During a visit to Washington, Djukanovic promised Clinton administration officials that Montenegro would cooperate with NATO’s plan to capture the wily Bosnian Serb leader. The NATO plan ultimately collapsed when a French Army major leaked intelligence concerning the operation to Karadzic.

In Serbia, the CIA scored a potential success when it secured the agreement of Yugoslav Army Chief of Staff Momcilo Perisic not to oppose a Montenegrin bid for independence. When Perisic’s contacts with the CIA and State Department were discovered by Milosevic’s ubiquitous counter-espionage agents, he was dismissed along with another important anti-Milosevic figure, Jovica Stanisic, the head of the Yugoslav intelligence service, the Sluzba drzavne bezbednosti - SDB.

Although it failed to establish a pro-U.S. cell in Serbia’s government, the CIA was more successful in Montenegro. Velibor Covic, the former Radio Free Europe correspondent in Podgorica, became chief editor for Montenegro Radio and Television. Radio Free Europe had long been funded by the CIA. Montenegro also established its own information agency, the Montenegrin Information Agency, which in Serbo-Croat is ironically known as the Crnogorska Informativna Agencija – or CIA!

Return to Iran-Contra: U.S. Support for the Drug-Dealing Kosovo Liberation Army

The CIA and the German intelligence service, the Bundesnacrichtendienst (BND), were early champions of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA or “UCK” in Albanian). According to sources in France that are close to European intelligence operations, the CIA used its considerable knowledge of how to set up front companies to enable the KLA to establish such fronts in Switzerland. Although the KLA used its front companies to funnel money from Albanian sympathizers with Swiss bank accounts to KLA personnel, the fronts were also used to funnel something else across Europe – heroin. Europol informed European Union interior ministers that based on a special inquiry conducted by Walter Kege, the head of the Sweden’s Sakherhetpolisen (SAPO) (the Swedish equivalent of the FBI), there was a firm connection between the KLA and an Albanian drug cartel in Tirana. German police were also said to be aware of this connection.

Alberto Maritati, the assistant anti-Mafia prosecutor in Italy, in an interview with the Italian newspaper Il Tempo, commented on the KLA’s drug and arms trafficking: “Recently we have noted an increase in the presence of Kosovar crime groups in deals linked to trafficking in arms and in heroin,” he said.

The Kosovars were apparently no stranger to the drug business. The Italians were aware that the Kosovo mafia was involved for over 30 years in smuggling heroin to Europe from Afghanistan via Turkey. Using its heroin proceeds and CIA connections, the KLA purchased high caliber machine guns, mortars, land mines and anti-tank rockets. Using training camps in Albania between the towns of Kukes and Tropoje, the KLA trains Kosovars from throughout Europe. Lending a hand are U.S. National Guardsmen of Albanian descent on loan from their units in the United States as well as U.S. mercenaries provided by Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI) of Alexandria, Virginia and Dyncorp of Reston, Virginia. These bands of irregular soldiers comprise the base of the so-called “Atlantic Brigade” of the KLA. The 2000-man brigade invokes memories of the famed Abraham Lincoln Brigade that fought against Franco’s forces during the Spanish Civil War on behalf of the loyalist forces. However, that brigade did not enjoy the same U.S. government support as does the Albanian brigade. In fact, many Abraham Lincoln brigadiers were hauled before the House Un-American Activities Committee to answer questions about their communist sympathies.

But no such questions were to be asked by Congress about U.S. support for the KLA, a group that the State Department had officially described as a terrorist organization. The CIA and BND reportedly arranged for Albanian military stocks to be covertly distributed to the KLA during anti-government riots that rocked Tirana in February and March 1997. This was only a few months before Clinton’s drug czar urged congress to approve weapons transfers to help Serbian and Montenegrin police fight drug dealing. Ironically, at the same time, the CIA was arming the KLA, which was financing its operations through its own drug dealing in Europe. It must have been a case of déjà vu for the CIA operatives who had made similar deals with the Nicaraguan contras and America’s favorite “Club Fed” guest, General Manuel Noriega. In another case of déjà vu for the CIA, it was reported that hundreds of Islamic militants allied with international terrorist Usama Bin Laden had joined with KLA forces in Kosovo and Albania. Originally trained by the CIA during the Afghan mujaheddin war against the Soviet Union, Bin Laden was the target of an October 1998 U.S. cruise missile attack on his bases in Afghanistan.

The Clinton administration had declared Bin Laden international public enemy number one after his alleged role in bombing the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in September 1998. By March 1999, Milosevic replaced Bin Laden as America’s most hated scoundrel. Meanwhile, and most intriguing, Bin Laden continued to pump volunteers and financial support to the U.S.-supported KLA from his secret bases in Afghanistan. Heroin also continued to flow to the KLA and its Albanian mafia allies from Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.

MPRI, through its close connections in Croatia and Bosnia, where it trained the national armies under an agreement with the State Department and Pentagon, provided American, German, and Croatian military uniforms to KLA troops. The fact that MPRI is headed by a number of former officials of the DIA, helped it to arranged for former ethnic Albanian officers in the armies of Yugoslavia and Slovenia to be seconded to the KLA. MPRI’s contacts in the international arms trade resulted in the KLA’s acquisition of American-made Barret sniper rifles and Bosnian manufactured Czech Skorpion machine guns. Through its Equip and Train program, MPRI looked the other way when Bosnia’s army arranged for millions of dollars worth of arms to be secretly transferred from Bosnian caches to KLA guerrillas in Kosovo and Yugoslav Muslims in the Yugoslav province of Sandzak.

Ironically, MPRI’s own connections with ethnic cleansing are legendary. In 1995, MPRI personnel were in on the planning with Croatian officers to ethnically cleanse Croatia’s Krajina province of some 100,000 ethnic Serbs. During “Operation Storm” and “Operation Strike,” many Serbs who were unable to flee were massacred by Croatian forces.